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DEVELOPING A MARKET FOR EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
Paul Rose
Mandatory arbitration has become the securities industry's preferred means
of resolving statutory employment discrimination disputes. However, as arbitration
has grown in popularity, it has come under increasingly intense scrutiny from
employee advocates and federal regulators. Regulators, lawyers, judges, and scholars
continue to grapple with the problem of balancing the benefits of arbitration-speed,
finality, and cost-effectiveness--against concerns over the fairness of arbitration
as it is practiced. In this Comment, Paul Rose analyses the mandatory
arbitration debate within the framework of regulatory competition theory. He
argues that as a legal product, arbitration generally fails to attract claimants who
have a choice between arbitration and the courts. He then discusses ways in
which arbitration providers may improve arbitral systems to ensure that arbi-
tration remains a viable option for claimants.
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INTRODUCTION
If "law is a product,"' and arbitration and litigation are types of legal
products available to claimants, arbitration will function more efficiently if
it competes for claims within a market environment. Until very recently, how-
ever, securities industry employees bringing statutory discrimination claims
have not had the opportunity to go "forum shopping"2 for the most attrac-
tive legal product; for the better part of a decade, arbitration has not been
1. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces ol the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. EcON.
&ORG. 225 (1985).
2. While I borrow some central language from the theory of regulatory competition, the
market theory discussed in this Comment differs from traditional regulatory competition models
in that it incorporates a vertical structure of competition, rather than focusing only on a horizon-
tal structure of competition. A vertical structure of competition is industry arbitration and nonindustry
arbitration, while a horizontal structure of competition is competition between the states. This
revised model owes more to Dan Esty and Damien Geradin's recent work on "regulatory co-opetition,"
concerning complex, multilayered regulatory schemes in which vertical and horizontal competition
and cooperation achieve greater market efficiency than could horizontal forum competitors. See Daniel
C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Regulatory Co-Opetition, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 235 (2000).
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"just another forum"3 for securities industry employment discrimination claim-
ants. Because employees sign mandatory arbitration agreements as a condition
of employment with securities firms, arbitration has been the only dispute reso-
lution system available to most employee claimants. However, in 1998, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) approved rule
changes that remove the mandatory arbitration clauses from the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) arbitration codes, a move that restores an employee's right to pursue
employment discrimination claims in court. To the extent that arbitration
does not operate efficiently in the market-that is, compete successfully
with the courts and other fora for claims-it must reinvent itself in order to
offer a competitive alternative. Indeed, since the NYSE and NASD rule
changes, securities industry arbitration has undergone many changes that
bring it closer to the standards of arbitration offered outside of the industry.
Although securities industry arbitration has not yet transformed itself into a
strong competitor with the courts for employment discrimination disputes, the
new market for these claims has brought about some important procedural
changes in industry arbitration.
The extensive literature on mandatory arbitration of securities industry
employment claims' has largely focused on the case law5 that serves as the basis
3. Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in Employment Contracts in the Securities Industry: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 18 (1998) [hereinafter
Hearing] (statement of Cliff Palefsky, Chairman, Sec. Indus. Arbitration Comm.).
4. See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived" and Lost in the
Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381 (1996); Norris Case, Arbitration of Workplace Discrimina-
tion Claims: Federal Law and Compulsory Arbitration, 14 TOuRo L. REV. 839 (1998); Sarah Rudolph
Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements
Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996); Joseph I. Goldstein & Martin F.
Payson, Compulsory Arbitration: Are Mandatory Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Disputes Enforceable
Under Current Law?, 1 J. ALTERNATIVE DiSP. RESOL. EMP. 40 (1999); Leona Green, Mandatory
Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: A Public Policy Issue in Need of a Legislative Solution,
12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 173 (1998); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print
to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997
Wis. L. REV. 33.
5. Some of the more important arbitration-related cases include Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (compelling arbitration of an age discrimination claim pursuant
to a mandatory arbitration agreement signed during registration with the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE)); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989) (holding
that claims under the Securities Act of 1933 may be arbitrated); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492
(1987) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act -required a securities firm employee to arbitrate
his statutory wage claim against his employer, pursuant to the mandatory arbitration agreement
signed during his registration with the NYSE); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 238, 242 (1987) (holding that claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act could be arbitrated); and Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985) (holding that claims under the
Sherman Antitrust Act may be arbitrated).
for arbitration. This critical body of work, the product of professors, students,
and employee advocates, has increased awareness of the shortcomings of the
securities industry arbitration system, and has guided policymakers in crafting
fairer arbitral frameworks. Another, smaller body of work has appeared in
response,' principally the work of practitioners who counsel securities firms,
that focuses on the benefits of arbitration for employees as well as employers.
Because arbitration of employment discrimination claims was (and to some
degree still is, as I discuss) mandatory for industry employees, these analyses
have predominantly focused on the legality, appropriateness, and fairness of arbi-
tration. Rather than discussing the merits of arbitration as an isolated forum,
however, this Comment sketches out an analysis of securities industry arbitration
as a competitive market product, and discusses how arbitration must evolve
in this new market to compete successfully for employment-related claims.
In Part I, this Comment looks at the benefits and burdens of securities
industry arbitration (offering a brief but essential background to the topic),
tracing the development of arbitration in the securities industry. In Part II, this
Comment focuses on the NASD's and the NYSE's elimination of mandatory
arbitration. In Part III, this Comment introduces the market for claims enabled
by the elimination of mandatory arbitration, and in Part IV, it notes the recent
changes in securities industry arbitration resulting from the new market for
claims. In Part V, this Comment considers the remaining obstacles to optimal
performance of the claims market. It then offers conclusions on the further
development of the claims market, noting that the regulatory co-opetition
model that this Comment introduces relies on the federal government to play
an active role in ensuring a competitive employment discrimination claims
market.
I. THE BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF ARBITRATION
Arbitration has gained popularity as a faster, cheaper, and generally less
disruptive7 means of dispute resolution. Not surprisingly, some of the most
ardent proponents of arbitration are judges, who see arbitration and other forms
6. See, e.g., Michael V. Abcarian & Michael E. Coles, Don't Abandon Arbitration Clauses,
TEX. LAW., May 24, 1999, at 23, WL 5/24/1999 TEXLAW 23; Gail Diane Cox, Arbitration Is No
Simple Matter, NAT'L L.J., June 28, 1999, at Al.
7. Arbitration may be less disruptive because it is generally less adversarial. Employees might
be able to continue working without the rift between the employer and the employee that often
develops in litigation. Thus, an employee whose claim is in arbitration, rather than litigation, might
not feel compelled to leave the workplace as would normally be the case with a litigated dispute.
However, this would probably not be the case when the employee asserts a statutory claim against
an employer, or when the hostility of the work environment was already so unbearable as to necessi-
tate the filing of a claim.
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of alternative dispute resolution as a means of reducing the number of cases
on their dockets.' Chief Justice Warren E. Burger noted that arbitration is an
effective tool for removing large cases and large classes of cases from the
docket.9
Supporters of arbitration also argue that arbitration offers better access
to justice for the economically disadvantaged," because many persons cannot
afford litigation's costs in time and money. One immediate advantage in
bringing a claim to arbitration is the lack of procedure and formality that
necessitates legal counsel in a litigated dispute."
Despite the advantages of arbitration, detractors of arbitration as prac-
ticed in the securities industry have found much to criticize. These criticisms
fall into two broad categories: public policy concerns and securities industry
forum concerns. The first group of criticisms attacks mandatory arbitration
of employment discrimination claims generally. The second group of criticisms
attacks the specific failures of securities industry arbitration.
A. Public Policy Concerns
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complains
that mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination disputes "privatizes"
enforcement of federal employment discrimination laws." The initial question
8. As Sarah Rudolph Cole notes, "the growth in federal court litigation has not been accom-
panied by an increased allocation of resources, particularly in the area of judicial appointments. The
assumption apparently has been that judges are capable of producing the same quality of work even
when their workload increases exponentially." Cole, supra note 4, at 449 (footnote omitted).
9. See Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 277 (1982).
10. For example, "many blue collar and non-managerial claimants are unable to secure counsel,
who are often reluctant to enter into a contingent fee arrangement with an employee whose poten-
tial recovery does not justify the substantial time and expense called for in discovery-intensive
discrimination cases." John W.R. Murray, Note, The Uncertain Legacy of Gilmer: Mandatory Arbitration
of Federal Employment Discrimination Claims, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281,296 (1999); see also Theodore
J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination Claims: Unmitigated Evil or Blessing
in Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1998).
11. However, Cliff Palefsky has argued that "the costs to an employee to vindicate his or her
rights in the arbitration forum are exorbitant, despite industry rhetoric to the contrary." Hearing,
supra note 3, at 79 (statement of Cliff Palefsky). Palefsky notes that filing a claim in a federal court
requires an initial filing fee of $150, whereas filing a claim with industry arbitration requires a $500
filing fee, plus forum fees of $1500 to $3000 per day. See id. Forum fees are "routinely in excess of
$20,000, and several have been in excess of $40,000, $60,000, or even, as in the case of Wolfe v.
Schwab, $82,000." Id.
12. Arbitration is becoming increasingly complex. Therefore, arbitration may not be the haven
from lawyers that some may have hoped. See Cox, supra note 6.
13. See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration, EEOC Notice 915.002, at
6, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb.html (last modified July 6, 2000) [hereinafter EEOC
Notice]; see also Motions on Alternative Dispute Resolution Adopted by EEOC April 25, 1995, 80 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-1 (Apr. 26, 1995).
for the EEOC, then, is not whether the securities industry's arbitration frame-
work adequately protects the rights of employees, but whether any private
industry has the authority to mandate arbitration of statutory employment
discrimination disputes. The EEOC contends that "Congress explicitly
entrusted the primary responsibility for the interpretation, administration, and
enforcement of these standards, and the public values they embody, to the fed-
eral government."'4 Also implicit in this declaration is the understanding
that the government agencies created by Congress to monitor employment
discrimination issues should have sole enforcement jurisdiction (as opposed
to oversight by the SEC). The EEOC points out that Congress created the
EEOC to investigate and conciliate claims of discrimination and to interpret
the law. Further, Congress gave it litigation authority to bring cases to court
that the EEOC could not administratively resolve.' 5 Congress also granted
enforcement authority to the U.S. Department of Justice, which litigates cases
involving state and local governments. 6 Finally, aggrieved individuals act as
"private attorneys general."'7 The private civil rights plaintiff serves not only
her own private interests, but also serves Congress by vindicating a policy that
Congress considered of the "'highest priority.""..8
Critics note that the very factors that make arbitration so attractive (low
cost, speed, and informality) bypass crucial procedural safeguards and basic
rights. 9 Among the basic rights given up by an employee who agrees or is
compelled to arbitrate is the right to a jury trial. The Civil Rights Act of
199120 ensured employees that a jury would decide factual issues (the question
of "[w]hat did the employer do to the employee?"2') and damage issues. Arbi-
tration, by contrast, gives all factual, legal, and damage issues to the arbi-
trators. 2  In addition, litigation typically affords an employee broader discovery
than arbitration. The goal of the arbitration forum is to resolve the dispute as
quickly and inexpensively as possible, and to achieve this goal, the arbitration




18. Id. (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
19. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494,
544-46 (1986) (arguing that the focus of arbitration-speed and low cost-ignores important proce-
dural protections).
20. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Star. 1074 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)).
21. RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT 147 (1997).
22. As noted by Richard Bales, employers prefer to have judges or arbitrators decide these
questions because (1) arbitrators and judges are seen as more predictable than juries; (2) employers
perceive jurors as the employees' peers, rather than the employers' peers, so are more likely to side
with the employee in disputes; and finally (3) employers believe that jurors are more likely to award
"jackpot" sums than are judges or arbitrators. See id. at 147-49.
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claimant will be subject to discovery rules designed to minimize the time and
effort necessary to resolve the claim.23 However, the employee bringing a Title
VII claim (an employment discrimination claim under the Civil Rights Act)
to court will typically receive generous access to employer information in order
to establish a case, 24 thus improving the claimant's chances for success. Broad
discovery might also be valuable to an employer,2 but employers typically do
not depend on discovery to the extent that employees do.26
Another frequent complaint is that arbitrators' decisions are not appeal-
able, except when the possibility of an appeal is incorporated in the contract,
thereby eliminating a check against anomalous decisions and procedural
errors.27 Critics argue that because arbitration is private in nature, there is
little public accountability. As the EEOC notes, "The lack of public dis-
closure not only weakens deterrence, but also prevents assessment of whether
practices of individual employers or particular industries are in need of
23. In arbitration, the emphasis is on efficient resolution of the dispute, rather than "prevent-
ing and deterring discrimination and ... making discrimination victims whole." EEOC Notice, supra
note 13 (capitalization removed).
24. Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26(b)(1), the information sought "need not
be admissible at the trial if [it] appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Courts construe this phrase broadly to encompass any matter
that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to another matter that could bear on, any issue that is or
may be in the case. See Jackson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 173 F.R.D. 524, 526 (D. Nev. 1997).
In Title VII cases, the court noted that "plaintiffs will often experience difficulty in rebutting with
direct evidence an employer's account of its own motives for terminating or rejecting an employee,
because '[diefendants of even minimal sophistication will neither admit discriminatory animus nor
leave a paper trial demonstrating it."' Id. at 527 (quoting Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690,
697 (7th Cit. 1987)). Title VII plaintiffs are thus allowed broad discovery in order to reveal circum-
stantial evidence, because "circumstantial proof may be critical for the jury's assessment of whether
a given employer was more likely than not to have acted from an unlawful motive." Id. at 528. On
the other hand, "arbitration systems are not suitable for resolving class or pattern or practice claims of
discrimination... [and] may, in fact, protect systemic discriminators by forcing claims to be adjudicated
one at a time, in isolation, without reference to a broader--and more accurate-view of an employer's
conduct." EEOC Notice, supra note 13; see also Hearing, supra note 3, at 79 (statement of Cliff Palesfky).
25. Employers may use discovery to obtain certain admissions from employees. The employer
then uses these admissions to get the case dismissed. See BALES, supra note 21, at 150.
26. However, employers in the securities industry may take advantage of the lack of evidentiary
restrictions that a federal court would normally impose:
In sexual harassment cases, for example, consensual sexual activity by the plaintiff with
persons other than the harasser is excluded under Federal law ... [y]et an arbitrator in
such a case, under no obligation to comply with such an evidentiary restriction, may
allow the employer to forage where it desires in a plaintiff's private conduct.
Hearing, supra note 3, at 79-80 (statement of Cliff Palefsky).
27. The standard for overturning erroneous arbitration decisions is prohibitively high. A
claimant must show that the arbitrator (1) knew the law, (2) found it applicable to the facts of the
case, but (3) specifically chose to ignore it. See id. at 78 (statement of Cliff Palefsky).
28. "Adjudication is more likely to do justice than... arbitration.., precisely because it vests
the power of the state in officials who act as trustees for the public, who are highly visible, and who
are committed to reason." Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1673 (1985).
reform."29 Public adjudication highlights patterns of discrimination in compa-
nies or industries," while some closed, private arbitration systems ignore the
value of public disclosure of discriminatory patterns.
In addition, the informality of arbitration in offering decisions without
written, reasoned opinions makes it difficult for courts to correct errors in
statutory interpretation. Critics of arbitration argue that because arbitral
decisions are not always written, reasoned, and published, arbitration does
not build a reliable framework through precedent.3 Courts give an arbitra-
tor's decision great deference,32 and usually will not review the arbitrator's deci-
sion even when the arbitrator has clearly misapplied a statute or has not relied
on otherwise binding precedent. Employee advocates, noting the courts'
deference to arbitration, argue that judges are too eager to unload lengthy
cases and large classes of cases involving statutory rights, a claim that seems
a short step away from accusing judges of sacrificing employee rights for a
lighter workload."
Finally, employee advocates argue that the contracts signed by NASD-
or NYSE-regulated employees are contracts of adhesion, or are at least exploita-
tive of the employee's weak bargaining position. 4 This argument has not
convinced the U.S. Supreme Court, however, which held in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp." that the typical securities industry "take-it-or-
leave-it" contract was not unenforceable simply because the employer exerts
29. EEOC Notice, supra note 13 (citation omitted).
30. The U.S. Supreme Court stated:
The disclosure through litigation of incidents or practices which violate national policies
respecting nondiscrimination in the work force is itself important, for the occurrence of viola-
tions may disclose patterns of noncompliance resulting from a misappreciation of [Title
Vll's] operation or entrenched resistance to its commands, either of which can be of industry-
wide significance.
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1995).
31. See EEOC Notice, supra note 13.
32. See BALES, supra note 21, at 151.
33. See Diane P. Wood, Court-Annexed Arbitration: The Wrong Cure, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 421, 430. Even some arbitration proponents would like to limit the type of cases that arbitrators
may hear. See Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 432 (1986).
34. The EEOC notes that
[t]he terms of the private agreement defining the arbitrator's authority and the arbitral
process are characteristically set by the more powerful party, the very party that the public
law seeks to regulate. We are aware of no examples of employees who insist on the man-
datory arbitration of future statutory employment disputes as a condition of accepting a job
offer-the very suggestion seems far-fetched. Rather, these agreements are imposed by
employers because they believe them to be in their interest, and they are made possible by the
employer's superior bargaining power.
EEOC Notice, supra note 13.
35. 500 U.S. 33 (1991).
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much greater bargaining power. 6 The Court left employees with as much
protection as they might receive in relation to any contract: The agreement
would not be enforced if it "resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming
economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of any con-
tract."'37 In market terms, the existence of market advantages, as described
in Gilmer, does not necessarily create an inefficient market. The abuse of mar-
ket advantages, however, should elicit action from market watchers and
regulators.
B. The Securities Industry Arbitral Framework
Having noted some of the general criticisms of mandatory arbitration,
this part focuses on the specific criticisms of securities industry employee
arbitration. This Comment first traces the development of arbitration in
the securities industry, and it then examines the existing arbitral framework
and the criticisms of that framework.
1. A History of Arbitration in the Securities Industry
Arbitration of securities industry disputes began in 1872, when the NYSE
instituted an arbitration forum to resolve disputes between member-dealers
and customers." The other exchanges followed over the next 100 years.39 How-
ever, arbitration was not used to resolve general employment disputes between
industry employers and employees until after the Supreme Court's 1987 deci-
sion in ShearsonlAnerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon." In McMahon, the Court
upheld the validity of predispute arbitration agreements between brokerage
firms and their customers under the Securities Exchange Act, allowing broker-
age firms to compel customers to resolve disputes through arbitration. Industry
firms were given court approbation to include mandatory arbitration clauses
in registration agreements between the employees and the exchanges, using
the existing arbitral framework to resolve employment disputes.
36. As noted by the EEOC, "[tihe Gilmer decision is not dispositive of whether employment
agreements that mandate binding arbitration of discrimination claims are enforceable. As explicitly
noted by the Court, the arbitration agreement at issue in Gilmer was not contained in an employment
contract." EEOC Notice, supra note 13, at n.2 (citations omitted).
37. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)).
38. See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Securities Industry Arbitrations: An Examination
and Analysis, 53 ALB. L. REV. 755, 769 (1989).
39. The American Stock Exchange followed in 1964, the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) in 1968, and the Chicago Board Options Exchange in 1973.
40. 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987).
When an individual accepts employment with an NASD or NYSE mem-
ber firm, she typically signs a standard employee agreement, with boilerplate
employment contract provisions such as nondisclosure clauses and disciplinary
clauses, for example. Increasingly, employers are inserting mandatory
arbitration clauses into the employment contracts as well.4
The Federal Arbitration Act 2 states that self-regulatory organizations
like the NASD or the NYSE may "require a natural person associated with
a member, or any class of such natural persons, to be registered with the asso-
ciation in accordance with procedures so established [by the rules of the asso-
ciation].'" 3 Registration has been mandatory for all associated persons effecting
securities transactions since 1993.4" The NASD, NYSE, and other self-regulatory
organizations require all persons associated with a broker-dealer4" to sign a man-
datory arbitration clause, Form U-4, the "Uniform Application for Securities
Industry Registration or Transfer."46 Form U-4 reads:
I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise
between me and my firm, or a customer, or any other person, that is
required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of the
[self regulatory organizations (SROs)] indicated in Item 11 as may be
amended from time to time and that any arbitration award rendered
41. This trend, while receiving most recognition in the securities industry context, has carried
over into all types of employment contexts. As the securities industry led the way in imposing
mandatory arbitration agreements, the industry is also leading the way in the creation of a market
for discrimination claims.
42. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, § 1, 61 Stat. 670-72 (1947) (current version at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-10 (1994)).
43. 9 U.S.C. § 15A(g)(3)(B).
44. See Compliance with Qualification Requirements of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 17
C.F.R. § 240.15b7-1 (2000). The rule provides:
No registered broker or dealer shall effect any transaction in, or induce the purchase or sale
of, any security unless any natural person associated with such broker or dealer who effects
or is involved in effecting such transaction is registered or approved in accordance with the
standards of training, experience, competence, and other qualification standards (including
but not limited to submitting and maintaining all required forms, paying all required fees,
and passing any required examinations) established by the rules of any national securities
exchange or national securities association of which such broker or dealer is a member or
under the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (if it is subject to the rules
of that organization).
Id.
45. The term broker or dealer encompasses all exchange-registered representatives, assistant
representatives, or principals.
46. FORM U-4, UNIFORM APPLICATION FOR SECURITIES INDUSTRY REGISTRATION OR
TRANSFER (rev. Aug. 1999). The Form U-4 was adopted effective October 1, 1975. See Self-Regulatory
Comm'n Orgs., Exchange Act Release No. 34-39,421, 62 Fed. Reg. 66,164, 66,164 n.4 (Dec. 17,
1997) [hereinafter Release No, 34-39,421].
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against me may be entered as a judgment in any court of competent
jurisdiction.47
Mandatory arbitration clauses for employment disputes were tested in
Perry v. Thomas,4" in which the Supreme Court again upheld the firms'
ability to compel arbitration. The Court held that the Federal Arbitration
Act49 required a securities firm employee to arbitrate his statutory wage claim
against his employer, pursuant to the arbitration agreement contained in Form
Perry was followed by the landmark mandatory arbitration case, Gilmer,
in which the Supreme Court held that claims brought under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act5 are arbitrable pursuant to the agreement in Form
U- 52
47. FORM U-4, supra note 46, at 4 (emphasis omitted). The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC or Commission) approved a new version of the Form U-4 on July 5, 1996. See Self-
Regulatory Orgs., Exchange Act Release No. 34-37,407, 61 Fed. Reg. 36,595, 36,595 (July 11, 1996).
The use of the revised form has been deferred pending changes to the Central Registration
Depository. See Self-Regulatory Orgs., Exchange Act Release No. 34-37,994, 61 Fed. Reg. 64,549,
64,550 (Dec. 5, 1996). Form U-4 thus incorporates the rules of the self-regulatory organization (SRO)
with which the individual is to be registered. NASD Rule 10101 provides as follows:
This Code of Arbitration Procedure is prescribed ... for the arbitration of any dispute,
claim, or controversy arising out of or in connection with the business of any member of the
Association, or arising out of the employment or termination of employment of associated
person(s) with any member, with the exception of disputes involving the insurance business of
any member which is also an insurance company.., between or among members and asso-
ciated persons ....
NASD, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE, Administrative Provision 10101 (1999), reprinted
in NASD Man. (CCH) 7511 (2000).
48. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
49. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-10 (1994).
50. See Perry, 482 U.S. at 489. Barclay Perry signed Form U-4, the Uniform Application
for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer. See Thomas v. Perry, 200 Cal. App. 3d 510, 513 (1988).
The exchanges require all exchange registrants to sign the form. See id. Form U-4 binds the employee
to adhere to the rules and regulations of the SROs. See id. It also contains an agreement to arbitrate
disputes arising out of the registrant's employment pursuant to the SRO rules. See id.
51. Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2, 81 Star. 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 621).
52. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 33, 35; (1991). The question of the
legality of mandatory arbitration for Title VII claims was somewhat complicated with a Massachusetts
district court opinion in Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, 995 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1998), affd on other
grounds, 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cit. 1999), and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens
& Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 996 (1998). The court in Duffield held that
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 prohibits the imposition of mandatory arbitration agreements in Title
VII claims. See id. at 1202-03. Some wondered if these cases would lead to the end of mandatory
arbitration of Title VII claims.
A recent spate of federal court opinions, however, has panicked employers and thrown a
pall over the way some companies view the future of mandatory arbitration programs. Nerv-
ous that the U.S. Supreme Court will rule that binding arbitration clauses are generally
unenforceable, employers have been tempted to abandon them.
Abcarian & Coles, supra note 6. However, Duffield and Rosenberg are aberrations--every other circuit
except the Sixth Circuit has castigated, or at least dismissed, Duffield and Rosenberg. The Supreme
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2. Criticisms of Securities Industry Arbitration
Employee advocates argue that securities industry employers possess an
unfair advantage as "repeat players""3 in the industry arbitral system. Employees
typically are only "one-shotters," who are generally not as skilled in negotiating
the arbitral process.54 This inexperience might reveal itself in the employee's
choice of arbitrators, for example; repeat players know which arbitrators are
likely to find in their favor, or are likely to offer smaller awards, and therefore
can make their choices accordingly.55
Employee advocates also complain that many securities industry arbi-
trators are biased in favor of employers because many arbitrators served in
management positions within the industry, have long-standing relationships
with management parties involved in the disputes, or in some cases, defended
the employers in legal actions.56 A related complaint is that arbitrators are
typically not qualified to handle employment disputes,57 because their industry
expertise relates to the resolution of broker-client disputes and corresponding
regulations."
Securities industry arbitrators are typically older, male, and white. While
white males might heavily populate the securities industry, those employees
most likely to bring statutory claims are not white males. Some sectors of the
securities industry (trading, for example) are particularly male-dominated
"testosterone alleys"59 with notorious records of harassment.'
Court recently passed on the chance to review Duffield despite the circuit split. See Duffield, 525
U.S. 996.
53. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS.
& EMP. POL'YJ. 189, 191 (1997). Other studies and surveys have offered evidence that employers
win before arbitrators more often than in front of juries, and that when employees do win, they are
usually awarded less in damages. See Alleyne, supra note 4, at 425-27; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 61.
54. See Bingham, supra note 53, at 195.
55. See id. at 192; see also EEOC Notice, supra note 13.
56. The American Arbitration Association (AAA) recently defended allegations that its arbi-
tration panels are biased in favor of employers because the panels are composed primarily of white, male
attorneys who usually represent management in employment disputes. See Olson v. Am. Arbitration
Ass'n, 876 F. Supp. 850, 851 (N.D. Tex. 1995); see also Margaret A. Jacobs, Woman Claims Arbiters
of Bias Are Biased, Too, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at B1.
57. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974).
58. A 1992 General Accounting Office study found that 89 percent of NYSE arbitrators
were male, 97 percent of arbitrators were white, .09 percent were black, .06 percent were Asian,
and about 1 percent were designated as "other." See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION: How REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES 8
(1994). The average age for male arbitrators was 60; the average age for female arbitrators was 49.
See id.
59. See LISA ENDLICH, GOLDMAN SACHS: THE CULTURE OF SUCCESS 191-92 (1999).
60. The experiences of an industry employee, Helen Walters, as reported by the Wall Street
Journal, represent uncommon, but not unique, industry behavior. Walters, who worked as a secretary,
endured threats, obscene insults, and gifts of condoms from her boss. Industry arbitrators dismissed
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1I. THE ELIMINATION OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION
When the NASD reorganized in 1996, the SEC required the NASD staff,
in its consideration of the future of NASD arbitration, to broaden its focus from
NASD members to various employee groups and governmental organizations.
In response to the SEC's regulatory pressure, the NASD Board of Directors
assembled a task force to examine the NASD arbitration forum generally.'
In January 1996, the task force released its Report on Securities Arbitration
Reform (Report). 2 The Report did not address employment arbitration exten-
sively, but it did offer some important recommendations. The task force deter-
mined that the NASD employment arbitration system offers advantages
in speed and cost over litigation, and adequately protects the crucial civil
rights noted in Title VII. However, the task force also recommended sev-
eral important changes, including expanded education for arbitrators, expanded
disclosure, and the development of a document production list for discovery
in employment claims. The task force noted that employment arbitration
was "rapidly evolving"63 and that the NASD should closely watch the devel-
opment of the law in this area. The Report encouraged the NASD to gather
opinions from other sources in order to find proper direction.64
The NASD responded to the report by seeking out opinions from member
firms, NASD Regulation District officials, employee and employer attorneys,
members of the Bar of the City of New York Labor and Employment Commit-
tee, and NYSE staff members.65 Then, in 1997, the NASD Regulation formed
her subsequent sexual harassment suit. See Margaret A. Jacobs, Men's Club--Riding Crop and
Slurs: How Wall Street Dealt With a Sex-Bias Case, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1994, at Al.
61. The NASD's Arbitration Policy Task Force was composed not only by regulatory officials,
but also by prominent employment law practitioners and industry representatives. See SECURITIES
ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE 3-5 (1996) [hereinafter
TASK FORCE REPORT].
62. See Release No. 34-39,421, supra note 46, 62 Fed. Reg. 66,164, 66,165.
63. Id. at 66,166 n.19.
64. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 61, at 122-23.
65. Unsurprisingly, the employers' groups contended that the process was fair as practiced
and represented a superior alternative to litigation. Employees' groups believed that the NASD and
other self-regulatory organizations should make arbitration voluntary for employment discrimination
claims. Some persons meeting with NASD staff suggested that the NASD adopt the "Due Process
Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of the Employment
Relationship" (Due Process Protocol), which sets out employee-friendly procedural standards for
arbitration. The Due Process Protocol was offered by a task force composed of a variety of organizations
involved in employment law, representing employees, member firm general counsels, and employment
arbitrators. A task force composed of individuals involved in labor and employment law developed
the Due Process Protocol in 1995, after examining due process issues surrounding arbitration and
mediation in the employment context. The American Bar Association (ABA) and various dispute
resolution organizations have subsequently endorsed the Due Process Protocol. The Task Force
included: Christopher A. Barreca, Co-Chair, Partner, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, Rep.,
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an Advisory Committee (Committee) to offer specific recommendations on
employment arbitration.66 The Committee held a meeting in June 1997, and
invited the EEOC, general counsel of member firms, employee groups and
civil rights groups, and counsel for employees and employers. The Commit-
tee then consulted neutral arbitration experts and discussed its findings with
NASD management."
Council of Labor & Employment Section, ABA; Max Zimny, Co-Chair, General Counsel, Interna-
tional Ladies' Garment Workers' Union Rep., Council of Labor & Employment Section, ABA; Arnold
Zack, Co-Chair, President, National Academy of Arbitrators; Carl E. VerBeek, Management Co-Chair,
Partner, Varnum Riddering Schmidt & Howlett, Arbitration Committee of Labor & Employment
Section, ABA; Robert D. Manning, Angoff, Goldman, Manning, Pyle, Wanger & Hiatt, P.C., Union
Co-Chair, Arbitration Committee of Labor & Employment Section, ABA; Charles F. Ipavec,
Arbitrator, Neutral Co-Chair, Arbitration Committee of Labor & Employment Section, ABA; George
H. Friedman, Senior Vice President, AAA; Michael F. Hoellering, General Counsel, AAA; W.
Bruce Newman, Rep., Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution; Wilma Liebman, Special Assistant
to the Director, Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service; Joseph Garrison, President, National
Employment Lawyers Association; Lewis Maltby, Director, Workplace Rights Project, American
Civil Liberties Union. See AAA, Resolving Employment Disputes-A Practical Guide, May 9, 1995, at 21.
66. The six-person Advisory Committee held a meeting in June of 1997, inviting the EEOC,
general counsel of member firms, employees' groups and civil rights groups, and employee and employer
counsel. The committee theh consulted neutral arbitration experts and discussed their findings with
NASD management. See Release No. 34-39,421, supra note 46, 62 Fed. Reg. 66,164, 66,166.
67. NASD management was not only influenced by these recommendations, but also faced
congressional pressure. In February 1997, Representatives Edward J. Markey, Anna G. Eshoo, and Jesse
L. Jackson, Jr., wrote to Chairman Levitt of the SEC, joining the EEOC in questioning the authority
of the NASD and other SROs to require arbitration of employment discrimination claims. See id.
at 66,166 n.21 (citing Letter from Representatives Edward J. Markey, Anna G. Eshoo, and Jesse L.
Jackson, Jr., to Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC (Feb. 3, 1997)). The SEC responded:
With regard to whether the mandatory arbitration requirement was within the scope of
the NASD's authority, the Commission's response stated that sound arguments could be
made on both sides of the issue. The Commission acknowledged that the NASD rule
requiring registered persons to arbitrate employment disputes was approved by the Commis-
sion as being consistent with the Act, and that it would not be unreasonable to conclude that
SROs do have the authority to mandate the arbitration of discrimination claims, provided
that fair procedures are in place.
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Letter from Chairman Levitt, to Representative Markey (Mar. 17, 1997)).
Markey introduced legislation that would give employees the statutory right to have employment
discrimination claims heard in court, or if they so agreed after the dispute arose, to have the claims heard
in arbitration. See Release No. 34-39,421, supra note 46, 62 Fed. Reg. 66,164, 66,166. Isaac Hunt,
speaking for the Commission, stated that "the decision as to whether to amend the Federal civil
rights laws and the Federal Arbitration Act is uniquely an issue for Congress to decide. The Commis-
sion supports [the bill] if Congress believes it will enhance the civil rights of securities industry
employees." Hearing, supra note 3, at 12 (statement of Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., Commissioner, SEC)
The bill died in committee, and has been reintroduced each year since. The latest Senate version
of the bill, sponsored by Senator Russell Feingold, was introduced on January 19, 1999, and received
three co-sponsors by September. The bill never made it out of the Committee on Health, Educa-
tion, Labor, and Pensions. See S. 121, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999) (proposing to amend certain
federal civil rights statutes to prevent the involuntary application of arbitration to claims that arise
from unlawful employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age,
or disability, and for other purposes).
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The NASD reported that "[a]fter consideration of all the views pre-
sented, and in light of the public perception that civil rights claims may present
important legal issues better dealt with in a judicial setting, the NASD deter-
mined that the appropriate action was to remove the arbitration requirement
for such claims."' In August 1997, recommendations were made to the NASD
and the NASD Regulation Boards (Boards).69 The Boards voted to amend
the NASD's rules to exclude from the mandatory arbitration requirement
all employment discrimination and sexual harassment claims made under fed-
eral or state statutes." The rule change was to take effect one year after
approval by the SEC, giving the NASD time to enhance the arbitration forum"so that employees will have confidence that there are adequate procedures
and safeguards of their rights in NASD arbitration."71 The one-year period
was also designed to "permit employees and firms to determine what agree-
ments they might wish to reach with regard to dispute resolution."72
The Boards decided that although "associated persons are no longer
required, solely by virtue of their association or their registration with the
NASD, to arbitrate claims of statutory employment discrimination[, aissociated
persons still will be required to arbitrate other employment-related claims,
as well as any business-related claims involving investors or other persons."'73
The Boards also voted to require that any arbitration agreements used by firms
select as the arbitration forum either an SRO or another forum meeting certain
due process standards, adding that the NASD would work with member firms
and employees to define the details of such standards. Finally, the Boards
voted to provide better disclosure to registered persons of their rights and of
the features of arbitration, so that employees are made aware of any rights or
remedies they may be giving up by signing Form U-4."4
A. The NASD Rule Changes
In October 1997, the NASD sent a proposed rule change to its Code of
Arbitration to the SEC. The rule change advanced two broad goals. First, the
NASD hoped the rule change would enhance the dispute resolution process for







the handling of employment discrimination disputes." Second, the NASD
designed the rule change to expand disclosure to employees concerning the
arbitration of all disputes.76
The NASD rule change permitted employees to choose between entering
into private arbitration agreements with their employers, or reserving the right
to file a case in federal or state court for statutory discrimination claims.7
However, NASD-registered employees were still required to arbitrate all other
types of claims, including claims arising under the Family and Medical Leave
Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), and all com-
mon law claims (for example, wrongful termination, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, defamation, negligent supervision, invasion of privacy,
and tortious interference with economic opportunity) that are often joined
with statutory claims of employment discrimination.
In addition, an NASD-registered employee cannot file a statutory dis-
crimination claim in court if she is obligated to arbitrate pursuant to a separate
agreement entered into either before or after the dispute arose. Depending on
the employer's policy, then, the NASD rule change offers employees no real
protection should employers decide to require mandatory arbitration through
their own mandatory arbitration agreements, instead of relying on NASD
regulations, as many had in the past.
78
B. Response to the Rule Changes
The SEC was eager to approve the rule change, and SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt commented that "this rule is a big step in a positive direc-
tion."79 The Commission carefully noted, however, that its approval of the
NASD rule change "does not indicate that the Commission necessarily con-




78. Employers sometimes create in-house arbitration systems, or use outside, independent
arbitrators. Some in-house arbitration systems, such as Merrill Lynch's system, are quite elaborate.
However, some employees enjoy somewhat of a free market system for arbitration, because they
may seek to arbitrate through the NASD, an independent arbitrator, or their own company's
system. Because of this "competition" for claims, companies are now working harder to improve
their arbitration framework in order to make it more attractive to employees.
79. Press Release, SEC Approves Proposal by the NASD Which Eliminates Requirement
that Employees Must Arbitrate Statutory Discrimination Claims (June 23, 1998), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/98-61.txt.
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claims fairly."' However, in the unique area of employment discrimination, the
Commission believes that the NASD and other SROs should not require
arbitration.8'
The Commission also addressed the concern that member firms would
attempt to skirt the NASD rule by requiring their employees to agree to man-
datory arbitration through an agreement separate from Form U-4. After the
rule change, one member firm stated that it would not require employees to
sign such an agreement, and the Commission expected other employers to
follow. The Commission also expected to join with the NASD and other
SROs in monitoring changes in the use of separate employment contracts
by industry firms. 2
1. Solicited Comments
The NASD rule change could not satisfy all involved, and various
groups expressed their disapproval at the rule's shortcomings. One of the
commenters, Jeffrey L. Liddle, opposed the rule change because he did not
believe that the rule went far enough.83 Liddle argued that the SEC should
prohibit arbitration of all employment claims." Liddle viewed the NASD
decision to exclude certain statutory employment claims from mandatory
arbitration as an admission of the failure of the NASD arbitral system in
dealing with these types of claims.85
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. See Release No. 34-39,421, supra note 46, 62 Fed. Reg. 66,164, 66,166.
83. See Self-Regulatory Orgs., Exchange Act Release No. 34-40,109, available at 1998 SEC
LEXIS 1223, at *16 (citing Letter from Jeffrey L. Liddle, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Jan. 2,
1998) (on file with the SEC)).
84. See id.
85. Jeffrey Liddle argued that the NASD's recent changes suggest that the SRO views its
own arbitration process as "fundamentally unfair," and unable to afford a claimant with "a full and
fair opportunity to vindicate his or her rights." Id. at *16 n.33. Liddle was joined by New York
Attorney General Dennis C. Vacco in asserting that the proposal should include not only statu-
tory employment claims, but all common law employment claims, including wrongful termina-
tion, defamation, negligent supervision, invasion of privacy, tortious interference with economic
opportunity, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id. at *17 (citing Letter from Dennis
C. Vacco, N.Y. Attorney General, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 17, 1997) (on file
with the SEC)). Helen Norton, director of Equal Opportunity Programs for the Women's Legal
Defense Fund, stated that the proposal should include all statutory employment rights, such as those
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act. See
id. at *17 n.34 (citing Letter from Helen Norton, Director of Equal Opportunity Programs,
Women's Legal Defense Fund, to Jonathan G. Katz (Jan. 17, 1998) (on file with the SEC)).
An unlikely pair of commenters opposed the rule change because of
the potential bifurcation of claims resulting from the ability of employees or
employers to choose the courts in statutory discrimination actions. On the
one hand, W. Hardy Callcott, vice president and deputy general counsel of
Charles Schwab, warned that the bifurcation of claims would be too inefficient
for employers and employees.86 Schwab, like most employers, prefers to see all
claims handled through cost-effective, predictable arbitration. On the other
hand, Jeffrey Liddle opposed the rule change because he believed that the
courts should handle all employment claims, including common law claims.87
The commenters noted that by allowing the litigation of statutory dis-
crimination claims, while forcing all other claims to arbitration, many claims
based on the same alleged facts would be inefficiently adjudicated in separate
venues. The bifurcation of claims could impose a heavy financial burden on
employees and firms.88 Bifurcation could also result in a slower resolution of
claims and create disputes over scheduling and discovery.89
Schwab expressed concern that employees might file pretextual statutory
discrimination claims in order to access more liberal discovery from the
courts.9" In addition, Schwab noted that the orders resulting from the sepa-
rate proceedings might conflict with one another.9' Finally, another rub of the
bifurcation issue was that there might be possible res judicata and collateral
estoppel effects of the arbitration on the statutory discrimination claims and
issues brought before the court."
86. See id. at *18 n.40 (citing Letter from W. Hardy Callcott, Vice President and Deputy
General Counsel, Charles Schwab, to Jonathan G. Katz (Jan. 6, 1997) (on file with the SEC)).
87. See id. at *18.
88. See id. Schwab noted that "the court case and arbitration case might occur in different
states, requiring different lawyers and further increasing the costs of final resolution." Id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at *18 n.40.
91. In his letter,
Schwab argued that, because it is more likely that arbitrations and investigations will now
occur at the same time because the arbitration necessarily will not resolve the discrimination
claims, the proposal creates the potential for conflict between investigations by the EEOC
or comparable state or local agencies, and arbitrations. Schwab also maintained that parties
to arbitration would then subpoena the investigatory files and submit the information to
the arbitration panels, who are likely to misunderstand the information in those files, which
may be gathered without due process or significant input from the parties involved. Schwab
suggested that EEOC and comparable state investigative files should not be subject to dis-
covery or be admissible as evidence in arbitration.
92. See id. at *18.
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C. The NYSE Follows
1. The NYSE Proposal Letter
A year after the NASD proposal, the NYSE, "following Chairman Levitt's
suggestion,"' submitted a mandatory arbitration exception to the SEC. As
with the NASD rule change, NYSE-registered employees must arbitrate Family
and Medical Leave Act, ERISA, and all common law claims. However, the
NYSE proposal differs from the NASD proposal in one important respect.
The NASD requires registered employees to arbitrate statutory discrimination
claims if they have so agreed either before or after the dispute arose; the NYSE
goes further than the NASD "by proposing rule amendments under which
statutory discrimination claims will not be eligible for arbitration pursuant to
any predispute agreement to arbitrate. 94
The NYSE rule change added these several provisions to the NYSE rules:
The NYSE restated that arbitration remains the default dispute resolution
method for any controversy arising out of the employment, or termination of
employment, of a registered representative; however, if the claim alleges
employment discrimination (including any sexual harassment claim) in viola-
tion of a statute, employees or employers may opt for conventional litigation
of the dispute. Arbitration is available only if the parties have agreed to arbi-
trate the claim after it has arisen.9'
D. Concerns with Both Models
While the rule changes represent an important step by the securities
industry toward the creation of a fair arbitral system, the rule changes did
not resolve some of the more egregious problems with securities industry
arbitration. Although employees now had the option of arbitrating statutory
discrimination claims, fundamental flaws in the arbitral framework of both
the NASD and NYSE remained, so that the industry would probably lose
all employment discrimination claims to the courts.
When the NYSE and the NASD proposed the rule changes, neither
offered any plan to address problems of arbitrator qualifications, although
93. Self-Regulatory Orgs., Exchange Act Release No. 34-40,479, 1998 SEC LEXIS 2054, at *8
(Sept. 24, 1998) [hereinafter NYSE Proposal Letter].
94. Id.
95. See NYSE Rule 347, reprinted in 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 3599-3 (1984).
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the NASD recognized the need and had plans in the works. In addition, nei-
ther had resolved the problem of the bifurcation of claims. In its rule change
proposal letter to the SEC, the NYSE mentioned the bifurcation problem in
circumstances in which "employment disputes... contain both contract or tort
claims as well as statutory employment discrimination claims."'96 The NYSE
noted that because NYSE Rule 347 required arbitration of claims 'at the
instance' of either party, and therefore may be waived, the entire case may
be heard in court if the parties so agree.97 However, the NYSE stated that
"employees in many instances believe that arbitration is preferable to pro-
tracted and expensive litigation," and will willingly choose to have their
claims arbitrated." This assertion was unrealistic, as the NASD efforts to alter
its own arbitral forum showed. Instead, "when a petition to compel arbitration
is filed, it is always the employer who is seeking to compel arbitration, while
the employee is inevitably attempting to bring his or her claims in Federal
or in State court."' Clearly, securities industry arbitration was not in a posi-
tion to compete with the courts for discrimination claims.
III. THE MARKET FOR CLAIMS
This part introduces a basic market theory, regulatory competition, and
then focuses on a refinement of this theory, regulatory co-opetition, as well as
its application to the securities industry employment discrimination claims
market.
As Cass Sunstein notes, "We are in the midst of a period of mounting
enthusiasm for free markets,"'" and, naturally, for market analysis. The idea of
"law as a product" in a market, as developed by Roberta Romano and others,
has served as a useful tool in the analysis of state corporate and securities
laws, environmental regulation, antitrust, banking, and product safety.'"' The
paradigm legal product analysis examines the ways in which different states
engage in "regulatory competition" for corporate dollars by creating attractive
regulatory schemes for businesses. At a basic level, the analysis of different
96. NYSE Proposal Letter, supra note 93, 1998 SEC LEXIS 2054, at *13.
97. Id.
98. Id. at *13-*14.
99. Hearing, supra note 3, at 80 (statement of Cliff Palefsky (citing Schwartz, supra note 4,
at 122-23)); see also Stuart H. Bompey & Michael P. Pappas, Is There a Better Way? Compulsory
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims After Gilmer, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 196 (1993-1994).
100. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 3 (1997).
101. See Esty & Geradin, supra note 2, at 236 n.4.
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regulatory schemes provides market participants with. information on the rela-
tive merits of various approaches, and it allows policymakers to restructure
their jurisdiction's regulatory scheme to maximize its appeal.
Some detractors of the regulatory competition model argue that the model
fails to describe complex, multifaceted markets.10 2 First, the prevailing regu-
latory competition theory fails to note that cooperation among jurisdictions
is often essential to market efficiency. In addition, the horizontal competitive
mechanism (for example, competition among states or among securities firms)
often does not exert real competitive pressure on inefficient market performers.
Turning to the specific challenges of the securities industry employment
claims market, this Comment argues that, just as states compete with one
another to attract firms by designing attractive regulatory regimes, an open
claims market will force arbitral systems to compete among themselves for
employment disputes. Member firms will compete horizontally with one
another, and with the exchanges' arbitration systems, in an effort to save on
external arbitration expenses, to retain employees, and to avoid negative
publicity. However, the employment claims market differs from the interstate
market because it involves both governmental and nongovernmental actors-
arbitration competes vertically with the courts. The courts, as a branch of the
government, exercise authority over arbitral systems as required, or as they are
able to, within the existing legal framework. Nevertheless, our legal frame-
work allows arbitral systems to compete with the courts for many types of
cases---even those dealing with the enforcement of federal discrimination
statutes. However, in an unusual twist on the standard model of competi-
tion, governmental agencies, as well as the courts, have an interest in the
success of their market "competitors." Also, SROs, like the NASD and the
NYSE, have an interest in promoting fair arbitration programs among securities
firms, if only to reduce the amount of effort the SROs themselves must dedicate
to dispute resolution. Thus, the market features cooperation between gov-
ernmental actors and nongovernmental actors, SROs and industry firms.
This combination of traditional competition and "cooperative" competi-
tion requires a more nuanced model for analysis and evaluation. As an alterna-
tive to the regulatory competition model, Dan Esty and Damien Geradin
developed the "regulatory co-opetition" model. The regulatory co-opetition
model, like the regulatory competition model, focuses primarily on gov-
ernmental actors. Unlike regulatory competition theory, however, which
102. See id. at 237.
investigates competition between horizontally arrayed governmental competi-
tors, the regulatory co-opetition model frames three dynamic relationships:
(1) intergovernmental (competition among governments, both horizontally
and vertically arrayed), (2) intragovemmental (the give and take among gov-
ernmental departments and officials), and (3) extragovemmental (competition
and cooperation among governmental and nongovernmental market partici-
pants)., 3 The regulatory co-opetition model thus provides the analytic tools
to investigate these relationships, which in turn affords a better understanding
of competitive arbitration policies, potential market failures, and the role of
governmental regulation.
A. A Securities Industry Regulatory Co-Opetition Model
As this Comment applies this more nuanced model to the complex
securities industry employment claims market, I must note a few slight adjust-
ments. First, the primary market participants are not governmental entities but
rather the securities firms and self-regulatory organizations. The courts typi-
cally want to unload, rather than attract, employment disputes.
Consequently, the courts generally will take on only the most problematic
cases, such as class action litigation. My categories, then, cover dispute
resolution fora, rather than governmental units. The three dynamic
relationships described by Esty and Geradin survive in slightly modified
forms: (1) interforum (competition among securities firms, and between firm
arbitral fora and SRO fora), (2) intraforum (give and take between
securities firm departments, for example, the give and take between the
human resources and the legal departments), and (3) extraforum (competition
between industry arbitration and the courts).
1. Interforum Competition: Attracting Claims Among
Industry Competitors
When claimants have their choice of arbitral systems, these systems will
need to reinvent themselves to respond to the client-claimant's needs. When
arbitration systems are not required to compete, they are not likely to require
as much from their arbitrators in training, adherence to the law, and reasoning
of opinions. Also, arbitration systems in competition with one another will
103. See id. at 238.
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be more likely to operate at optimal levels of efficiency. for the handling of
claims, will offer "competitive" settlements, and will likely become more
transparent in their functioning. However, employees may nevertheless choose
to accept protracted and expensive litigation over an arbitral system that
does not offer them vindication of their rights to the extent that the courts
could. The natural advantages of arbitration over litigation in speed and cost
will not always be enough to offset the courts' advantages in predictability,
the chance to appeal, broad discovery, the right to a jury trial, the award
size, and the satisfaction of a public victory. Arbitral systems must be more
competitive to attract client-claimants. The market will force competitors,
who fail to address these concerns, "out-of-business" in the areas in which they
are slow to compete."'
From an economist's (and employee's) perspective, mobility is an essential
factor in the success of the claims market. Employees must be able to forum-
shop, at least among a few horizontal competitors. The ,lack of an efficient
horizontal competitive structure exposes the inadequacies of the basic two-
player competitive structure (one arbitration forum and the court system). The
cost, length, and adversarial nature of litigation might force employees to
accept a dehumanizing, unsatisfactory arbitration settlement. On the other
hand, an employee may choose to suffer through several years of litigation to
achieve a costly public finding of employer wrongdoing. These options do
not represent true market choice, but catch-22 forced consumption. Genuine
competition between securities firms, and between firms and SROs, will
increase an employee's chancesof finding a fair bargain.
The competition among firms and between firms and SROs is very differ-
ent. The competition between firms occurs before the claim arises. The firms
are not competing for claims (because a PaineWebber employee cannot elect
to use Merrill Lynch's arbitration system) as much as they are competing for
employees and for good will."' Competition between firms and SROs occurs
after the claim arises. Securities firms have an interest in keeping arbitration
104. Historically, discrimination claims constitute less than 2 percent of all claims filed at the
NYSE, see NYSE, NYSE Information Memo 99-3 (Jan. 11, 1999), 1999 NYSE Info. Memo LEXIS 1,
so the NYSE is likely not concerned about losing this small piece of their arbitration business.
105. However, an insidious potential side effect of the market for claims is that employers
may seek to hire employees who are less likely to bring discrimination claims--white males. This con-
cern is mitigated by the operation of the third relationship of my revised regulatory model, the vertical
competition/cooperation dynamic. See infra Part III.A.3. Continued regulation by the EEOC and
the SEC is essential to ensure a fair market. The fair market for claims begins with fair employ-
ment practices, as regulated by these agencies.
in-house, or through arbitration providers with whom the firms have
negotiated specific provisions and prices. The market functions efficiently only
if there exists both vertical mobility (the ability to take some or all claims to
court) and horizontal mobility (the ability to take some or all claims to another
arbitral system).
2. Intraforum Competition: Departments Within the Firm
The various departments of a securities firm might share a common objec-
tive (for instance to become the "best bank" or the most client-oriented
brokerage house), but might differ in their means of contributing to that goal.
Notably, most, if not all, securities industry firms have nondiscrimination
policies and minority hiring plans that are overseen by the human resources
department. The legal department will support these policies according to
business instructions and state and federal regulations. However, the two
departments might seek different objectives once a claim has arisen. The
human resources department could be concerned with employee retention,
while the legal department wants to bury the claim as quickly as possible
through whatever means available. The efforts of the minority recruiting
director, for example, might be undermined by the efforts of a legal depart-
ment that has a reputation for strong-arming discrimination claimants into
unfair settlements. Corporate directors might unwittingly exacerbate this prob-
lem by creating incentive packages that promote competing agendas-a bonus
for success in recruiting minority candidates, and one for avoiding litigation
and settlement costs.
3. Extraforum Competition: The Courts and Arbitration Systems
Arbitration systems should not only be attractive relative to one another,
but also relative to the courts. A competitive vertical market for claims forces
primary market participants "to abandon the manipulation of regulatory
mechanisms for private gain ('capture'),"'' 6 and to adopt decisions better in line
with claimant preferences. Before the SROs abandoned mandatory arbitration
of employment discrimination claims, the courts (or the threat of the courts)
could exercise no market pressure on market actors. With this barrier removed,
the arbitral systems presumably will change policies to attract claims, to the
extent that their legal product is inferior to the courts.
106. Esty & Geradin, supra note 2, at 239.
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Of course, arbitration organizations and the courts compete against each
other for different reasons. Courts "compete" for claims only to the extent that
they are required to by law. The federal courts are unwilling participants in the
claims marketplace. They do not actively seek out cases, but take those cases
that they must adjudicate by law. The duty of the court to respond to particular
questions, to rule on a point of law, engages the courts in the market for claims.
The arbitration forum, on the other hand, must be a more active
participant in the market. Arbitral systems are created by self-regulatory
organizations, such as the NYSE and the NASD, by member firms within
those organizations, or by wholly independent organizations such as the
American Arbitration Association (AAA), who then sell their arbitral
product to member firms and their employees. In the ideal market for
claims, all of these arbitral systems must compete with the courts for claims,
and so must make their product at least as attractive (or competitive) as that
of the courts.' ° In employment discrimination claims, at least, the lack of
competition between the courts and the arbitral systems has allowed the
arbitral systems to operate inefficiently, with a group of market participants
using market inequalities and the lack of product choice to gouge other
participants. The arbitration forum already enjoys many advantages over the
courts, but also lags behind the courts in many important areas. The securities
industry employment discrimination claims market, particularly, has not func-
tioned efficiently for claimants.
Gains in efficiency will come from the arbitral fora rather than the courts.
Courts are not likely to change their product, or if they do, will probably
respond slowly to changes in the marketplace. The court system, like a large,
bureaucracy-laden corporation, offers its client-claimants a name brand and
a predictable service. The courts also offer the possibility of a large return for
an employee's extra investment of time and effort-the large damage award.
Arbitration must obviously outperform the courts in order to lure claimants
away. Because of the position of the courts as a government entity and reluc-
tant competitor, the relationship between the courts and the arbitral system
is co-opetitive, rather than purely competitive. The courts cooperate with the
arbitral systems by encouraging or enforcing basic standards that the arbitral
systems must meet. Some of these basic standards might include adherence
107. The arbitral products must be at least as attractive to employees as litigation, but beauty is
in the eye of the consumer: Attractiveness does not imply similarity. Indeed, real choice in the
marketplace depends on the procedural differences between litigation, arbitration, and other forms
of dispute resolution.
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to the applicable law in deciding claims, reasoned written opinions, and some
training in the subject matter before them. If the arbitration systems are not
meeting these goals, the courts might rely on the enforcement strength of
the government's employment regulatory authority, the EEOC. The ability
of these regulatory bodies to enforce a competitive market could be enhanced
through passage of a bill like the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act. 8
The Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act was initiated as a response to
due process concerns, and would "amend certain Federal civil rights statutes
to prevent the involuntary application of arbitration to claims that arise from
unlawful employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age, or disability, and for other purposes."'" Thus, the act
would instantly create a more efficient market for discrimination claims by
forcing firms to compete with the courts and with other arbitral fora.."
Finally, the market itself will act as a deterrent. In an open market for
claims, firms that do not meet basic standards will lose claims to the courts,
n'
or to each other.
IV. THE NASD REVISION: A COMPETITIVE RESPONSE
This part moves from theoretical description to practical analysis of
arbitration in the new market for employment discrimination claims. The best
indications that arbitration will improve, within the market framework
described herein, come from a series of rapid changes in securities industry
arbitration since the elimination of the mandatory arbitration of employ-
ment discrimination claims.
A. The NASD Arbitration Improvements
As noted in Part III, regulatory pressures from the SEC persuaded the
NASD to reevaluate its arbitration format, resulting in the elimination of
108. The last time Congress tried to pass the Civil Rights Procedure Protection Act, the bill
died in committee. See H.R. 872, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 121, 106th Cong. (1999).
109. Id.
110. The act would also respond to complaints from employee rights organizations that claim
the SEC should not handle the administration of concerns surrounding the adjudication of employee
discrimination claims. See Hearing, supra note 3 (statement of Cliff Palefsky. The SEC or the industry
self-regulatory bodies would presumably limit or cease employment discrimination policymaking,
and would leave discrimination policing activities to the EEOC and the courts.
111. The effect of the horizontal competition between the courts and the arbitral systems pre-
vents the race to the bottom, in which complete deregulation of standards creates unattractive market
outcomes. See Esty & Geradin, supra note 2, at 237.
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mandatory arbitration. The industry and practitioner comments received as
part of the SEC's rule approval process put the NASD on notice of the
many potential obstacles facing arbitration in a competitive forum market.
The NASD understood that allowing the employees to choose between
arbitration and the courts would drastically decrease the number of claims
heard by industry arbitrators; employees choosing to litigate claims would
result in increased costs for the firms that the NASD represents."2 In
response to these competitive pressures, the NASD Regulation staff assem-
bled a working group composed of attorneys for employees, the general
counsel, and industry arbitrators with employment law expertise to advise
the NASD on employment arbitration matters, and to create a more effi-
cient and competitive arbitral system. The working group met on a number
of occasions in 1997 and 1998, and it assisted the NASD Regulation staff in
preparing recommendations to the NASD Board of Directors.
In October 1998, the NASD submitted an amendment to the NASD
Code of Arbitration approved by the SEC earlier that year. The amended
rules represent the best efforts to date of an industry-led solution to the
major complaints with employment arbitration. The proposal sets out a num-
ber of new provisions, based in large part on an earlier effort "to examine
questions of due process arising out of the use of mediation and arbitration
for resolving employment disputes": the "Due Process Protocol" (Protocol)." '
The Protocol recommendations have been adopted by several dispute resolu-
tion fora,1 4 and the NASD decided to follow the due process procedures
recommended in the Protocol.
After consideration of the Protocol, the working group and the NASD
Regulation staff made recommendations to the Boards. The Boards adopted
the recommendations in October 1998, and the NASD proposed the amend-
ments to the SEC. The SEC approved the changes in November, 1999. The
later (and more competitive) rule changes cover the qualifications of arbitra-
tors, the number of arbitrators hearing claims, and revised rules for discovery,
112. Just as the NASD's initial move to eliminate mandatory arbitration should be taken as
a response to regulatory pressures by the SEC and the threat of legislation, rather than as an inter-
nal impulse for reform, the NASD's later changes should be viewed as an effort to maintain arbitration
as a viable alternative to litigation, rather than as an expression of a new-found sympathy for
employees. Obviously, were it not for regulatory pressures to eliminate mandatory arbitration, which
resulted in arbitration's exposure to a competitive market, the NASD would have little incentive
to improve arbitration for employees.
113. AAA, supra note 65, at 16.
114. Two major arbitration providers, the AAA and JAMS/Endispute, have agreed to follow
the recommendations of the protocol.
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awards, and attorney's fees. These rules, which I briefly describe, also offer
a solution to the problem of bifurcation of claims, and offer new guidelines
for the disclosure of the effects of arbitration clauses.
1. Amendments to the NASD Code of Arbitration
a. Arbitrator Qualifications
The NASD addressed one of the most important shortcomings of secu-
rities industry employment discrimination by setting out stricter qualifications
for arbitrators who hear employment discrimination claims. The NASD based
its guidelines on the general recommendations of the Protocol. The Protocol
provided that "arbitrators selected for such cases should have skill in the con-
duct of hearings, knowledge of the statutory issues at stake in the dispute,
and familiarity with the workplace and employment environment..". The
NASD Regulation noted that many arbitrators on its roster have experi-
ence or training in employment law."6 Furthermore, the NASD Regulation
trains its arbitrators in employment law issues, with the help of experienced
employment attorneys. However, the NASD believed that to implement
the provisions of the Protocol it needed to create "a more specialized roster
of available arbitrators for intra-industry cases in which statutory
discrimination is alleged.'. 7  The NASD may use a specialized roster, or
may look to the rosters of other dispute resolution providers.
In order to create a specialized roster, the NASD Regulation proposed
that "[o]nly arbitrators classified as public [nonindustry] arbitrators ... shall
be selected to consider disputes involving a claim of employment discrimi-
nation, including a sexual harassment claim, in violation of a statute.." The
definition of "public arbitrator" excludes not only securities industry employees
and their immediate family members, but also attorneys, accountants, and
other professionals who have devoted 20 percent or more of their profes-
sional work in the last two years to clients who are engaged in the securities
business. "9
115. Id. at 18; see also Self-Regulatory Orgs., Exchange Release Act No. 34-41,461, 1999
SEC LEXIS 1099, at *17 [hereinafter NASD Proposal Letter].
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. NASD, Code of Arbitration Procedure Rule 10211(a) (proposed), in NASD Proposal
Letter, supra note 115, 1999 SEC LEXIS 1099, at *5-*6.
119. See NASD, Code of Arbitration Procedure Rule 10308, reprinted in NASD Man. (CCH)
7574 (1997).
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For single arbitrators hearing the employment discrimination claim, or
for chairpersons of an arbitration panel hearing an employment discrimi-
nation claim, the NASD Regulation proposed that the arbitrator must possess
the following: a law degree; membership in the Bar; "substantial familiarity
with employment law;" and ten or more years of legal experience that included
at least five years of law practice, law school teaching, government enforce-
ment of equal employment opportunity statutes, experience as a judge, arbi-
trator, or mediator, or experience as an equal opportunity enforcement officer
or in-house counsel of a corporation. In addition, the single arbitrator or panel
chairperson "may not have represented primarily the views of employees or
employers within the past five years," with "primarily" meaning 50 percent
or more of the arbitrator's business or professional activities."'
The NASD Regulation also proposed changes to the composition of
panels, so that for cases involving claims of employment discrimination,
whether or not other issues are also involved, all arbitrators must be classified
as public."' Finally, the NASD proposed a higher payment threshold for single
arbitrator cases. Under the proposed rules, a single arbitrator will handle
claims of $100,000 or less. The higher threshold lowers the cost for the parties
(this is, of course, especially relevant for client-claimants, who have found that
arbitration is not always as cheap as arbitration supporters contend 2 ). Fur-
thermore, the rule change allows for better use of the relatively scarce number
of qualified employment arbitrators. For claims seeking more than $100,000,
a three-person arbitration panel will decide the case."
b. Awards
The NASD Regulation also looked to the Protocol to redefine its awards
guidelines. The Protocol provides:
The arbitrator should be empowered to award whatever relief would
be available in court under the law. The arbitrator should issue an
opinion and award setting forth a summary of the issues, including
the type(s) of dispute(s), the damages and/or other relief requested and
120. However, note that "Rule 102 11(c) provides that parties may agree, after a dispute arises,
to waive any of the special qualifications contained in either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b). Such
a waiver is not valid if it is contained in a predispute arbitration agreement." NASD Proposal Letter,
supra note 115, 1999 SEC LEXIS 1099, at *20.
121. See NASD, Code of Arbitration Procedure Rule 10212(a), reprinted in NASD Man. (CCH)
7546 (1997). Again, however, "parties may agree to a different panel composition in a particular
case." NASD Proposal Letter, supra note 115, 1999 SEC LEXIS 1099, at *21.
122. See Hearing, supra note 3, at 79 (statement of Cliff Palefsky).
123. The parties may agree to have the case decided by a single arbitrator. See NASD, Code
of Arbitration Procedure Rule 10212, reprinted in NASD Man. (CCH) 7546 (1997).
428 48 UCLA LAW REVIEW 399 (2000)
awarded, a statement of any other issues resolved, and a statement
regarding the disposition of any statutory claim(s).'
The NASD Regulation adopted this wording as an amendment to the
Code of Arbitration, making only one language change to the Protocol recom-
mendation. The NASD deleted the word "opinion" in order to avoid con-
fusing parties who might otherwise anticipate a written opinion from the
arbitrator, such as they might receive from a judge. The NASD Regulation
was comfortable with the omission because parties may request underlying
reasons, although arbitrators may grant or deny the request.
25
c. Coordination of Claims
The NASD Regolation responded to the predictions of bifurcation made
by commenters on the first rule change, by proposing adoption of a new rule
on joinder of employment discrimination claims that may be filed in court,
and those required to be arbitrated under NASD rules. The rule allows parties
to resolve all related matters in court, if they so choose. Also, if a claimant
files an employment discrimination claim in court, and files related common
law claims in arbitration pursuant to a mandatory arbitration agreement, the
respondent has the option to combine all claims in court.2 6 The NASD
included a separate paragraph to clarify that "if an associated person files a
claim in court that includes matters that are subject to mandatory arbitration,
either by the rules of the NASD or by private agreement, the defending party
may move to compel arbitration of the claims that are subject to mandatory
arbitration.' 27 Thus, there exists a market for employment discrimination
124. NASD Proposal Letter, supra note 115, 1999 SEC LEXIS 1099, at *26; accord AAA, supra
note 65, at 20. One of the principal competitive advantages of litigation over arbitration is the possibil-
ity of a large jury award. While the NASD rule allows an arbitration panel to assess punitive damages,
these damages are probably not likely to be as high as a jury might award a claimant. Although
the possibility of the large jury award represents a significant advantage for litigation, an efficient
arbitration system may yet successfully compete for claims through its advantages of privacy, speed,
and possibly cost.
125. This may be a benefit of the court system that client-claimants are willing to forego. Hori-
zontal competitive pressures may force arbitration systems to require reasoned opinions of their arbi-
trators, but requiring opinions of arbitrators would likely increase the cost and decrease the speed
of arbitration.
126. The new NASD rule
would include a pre-filing procedure in which the claimant may certify to the Director of
Arbitration that he or she communicated with the respondent about the possibility of filing
all claims in court initially, in order to save the expense of arbitration fees and attorney
fees to draft arbitration claim papers. If the respondent does not agree to consolidate all
claims in court, and an arbitration claim is then filed, proposed Rule 10216 provides several
methods for coordinating claims filed in court and in arbitration.
NASD Proposal Letter, supra note 115, 1999 SEC LEXIS 1099, at *31-*32.
127. Id. at *37.
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claims, but not for other common law claims subject to mandatory arbitration
agreements. These claims are still subject to the inefficiencies of a closed
arbitration system. Thus, while employment discrimination claimants now
enjoy a better product, the common law claims market does not operate under
any competitive pressures."'
d. Disclosure When Signing Form U-4
The NASD Regulation also proposed adoption of a "model disclosure
statement" to be given to registrants signing Form U-4.'29 The disclosure state-
ment helps registrants understand what they are getting into by signing Form
U-4, and it both explains that Form U-4 contains a predispute arbitration
clause, and tells registrants where the clause is located on the form. The disclo-
sure statement further advises the registrant to read the arbitration agreement.
The NASD does not mention any arbitration agreements the registrant may
enter into or may have entered into, with the member firm. The NASD
expects member firms to "either mak[e] proper disclosure to its employees
about its private arbitration agreement, or risk[] an adverse decision in later
litigation concerning any inadequacy in the disclosure."'1
30
The proposed disclosure statement alerts the registrant that she is forfeit-
ing the right to sue in court except as provided by the rules of the arbitration
forum. The disclosure agreement then notes an exception to the arbitration
requirement for statutory employment discrimination claims.' 3' The statement
advises employees that the rules of other arbitration forums (the forum of the
employees' company, for example) may be different.
e. Discovery
The NASD Regulation also examined the Due Process Protocol guide-
lines on discovery. The Protocol notes that "[o]ne of the advantages of
arbitration is that there is usually less time and money spent in pre-trial
discovery," nevertheless, "[aldequate but limited pre-trial discovery is to be
encouraged and employees [and their representatives] should have access to
128. Nor is it likely to have any competitive pressure, at least from the courts. Clearly, the case
law supports mandatory arbitration of nonstatutory employment law claims, so the only competitive
pressure must come from other arbitral systems. See supra Part I.B.1.
129. NASD Proposal Letter, supra note 115, 1999 SEC LEXIS 1099, at *38.
130. Id.
131. This language avoids market inefficiency by including explicit language alerting a regis-
trant of his or her right to sue in employment discrimination cases. If such language were omitted,
the registrant might not work under the assumption that he or she may sue if victimized through
employment discrimination.
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all information reasonably relevant to mediation and/or arbitration of their
claims.' 32 The NASD approved of the language of the Protocol, but added
that employers enjoy the same rights to discovery as employees.' The
NASD Regulation felt that their current procedures concerning pretrial
discovery already met the Protocol criteria, so they did not need to alter their
procedures. However, the NASD Regulation proposed changes in their deposi-
tion procedures in employment discriminations cases to meet the Protocol
standard. The added clause states that "[n]ecessary pre-hearing depositions
consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration shall be available. 134
NASD arbitrators are to consider the relevancy of the information sought
from the deponent, as well as the time and expense of the deposition in
determining whether the deposition is necessary.
f. Attorney's Fees
Another important NASD Code of Arbitration change comes from
the Protocol's guidelines on attorney's fees.'36 The amended code gives the
arbitrator the "authority to provide for reasonable attorneys' fee reimbursement,
in whole or in part, as part of the remedy in accordance with applicable
law."'37 The attorney's fee amendment raises the NASD arbitration system
to the standard set by the courts. Thus, this amendment creates a much more
attractive product for lower-paid employment discrimination claimants.
132. See AAA, supra note 65, at 18.
133. The NASD notes that
there also could be situations in which the employee has documents that the employer
requires to prepare its case, such as records of the employee's outside business activities or
prior employment. Therefore, the NASD Regulation believes the term "employees" in the
quoted provision should be interpreted to include all parties to the employment dispute.
NASD Proposal Letter, supra note 115, 1999 SEC LEXIS 1099, at *22-*23.
134. NASD, Code of Arbitration Procedure Rule 10213(a), reprinted in NASD Man. (CCH)
7546 (1997).
135. See NASD Proposal Letter, supra note 115, 1999 SEC LEXIS 1099, at *23. "Such consid-
erations are already provided for in Rule 10321, paragraphs (d) and (e), which set forth procedures
for deciding unresolved issues either at the pre-hearing conference or by appointment of a selected
arbitrator." Id.
136. The Protocol states that
The amount and method of payment for representation should be determined between
the claimant and the representative. We recommend, however, a number of existing systems
which provide employer reimbursement of at least a portion of the employee's attorney
fees, especially for lower paid employees. The arbitrator should have the authority to provide
for fee reimbursement, in whole or in part, as part of the remedy in accordance with appli-
cable law or in the interests of justice.
AAA, supra note 65, at 17.
137. NASD Proposal Letter, supra note 115, 1999 SEC LEXIS 1099, at *26.
Developing a Market for Employment Discrimination Claims 431
The change also creates an incentive for attorneys to take arbitration claims
on a contingency basis, and to suggest arbitration to their clients.'38
B. Arbitration System Improvements Among Securities Firms
Recent changes in firm policies also indicate interforum competitive
pressure. In response to the open claims market, many NASD and NYSE
member firms have developed proprietary mediation and arbitration
systems. Member firms have two primary reasons for creating proprietary
arbitration systems. First, NASD and NYSE arbitration, while offering a
more private forum than cases brought before the courts, do not offer the
same level of privacy that member firms might enjoy in their own arbitra-
tion systems. When a case goes through NASD arbitration, victorious parties
may hold press conferences announcing the decision, although parties may
not make public many details surrounding the allegations. However, a mem-
ber firm may create an arbitral forum in which parties must keep decisions
private, as in a settlement agreement.
Many employees victimized through workplace discrimination see the
publication of an employer's wrongdoing as an important element of their
relief. Therefore, because member firm arbitration competes with NASD
and NYSE arbitration, as well as litigation in the courts, member firms who
wish to avoid discrimination publicity must make their arbitration systems
more competitive by offering incentives to counteract the benefits of publiciz-
ing the victory.'39 Firms might do this by reducing the costs associated with
bringing a claim through in-house arbitration. The firms might also offer a
more timely resolution to the claim than industry arbitration (and, certainly,
the courts).
Another potential benefit to proprietary arbitration is the potential
decreased cost of this arbitration."4 Member firms might negotiate a deal
with an arbitration provider to offer their services at a discount as compared
138. Generally, employment lawyers have dissuaded clients from pursuing claims in arbitration.
See Hearing, supra note 3 (statement of Cliff Palefsky).
139. A public opinion also must be considered an important element in the pricing of incentives.
The publication of the proceedings and the opinion affects not only the individual employee, but
other employees who need the information in order to, inter alia, assess their chances in arbitration.
See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
140. As noted by Patricia Ireland, president of National Organization for Women (NOW):
Since the only way women and people of color can have their day in court is to form a class
and sue, companies-like Smith Barney-face expensive class-action suits in federal
court. The plaintiffs in the Smith Barney case never would have initiated a class-action
if they could have had access to the courts. Ultimately, even billion-dollar Wall Street
companies will benefit when arbitration is an option-not a mandate.
Hearing, supra note 3, available at 1998 WL 437056 (statement of Patricia Ireland, President, NOW).
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to the fees paid by the corporation and its employees to the exchanges' dis-
pute resolution programs. While this decreased cost also represents a com-
petitive incentive to the employee, the arbitral system contracted by the
member firm may offer a product inferior to the exchanges' dispute resolution
programs; employees may need to investigate the quality of the forum. How-
ever, because claimants may not be able to evaluate the benefits of a forum,
the EEOC could perform a valuable service by investigating arbitration
providers and providing claimants with the information obtained.
The member firm's arbitration provider must achieve a delicate balance
between employers' interests and employees' interests. On the one hand, the
arbitration provider may be competing with other arbitration providers for
the firm's business, so there exists some competitive pressure to skew results
in favor of employers rather than employees. On the other hand, the ulti-
mate client remains the employee, who still has the choice of exchange dis-
pute resolution or litigation through the courts. Arbitration providers who
sell their services to member firms must find the right balance between these
interests in order to retain business.
Merrill Lynch was first among those member firms to follow the NASD
in repealing mandatory arbitration (although the move resulted from a set-
tlement in an employment discrimination suit brought by eight women rep-
resenting a class of 2500 female brokers). Merrill Lynch agreed to handle
claims through a new ADR T  process created with assistance from the
Northwestern University School of Law.
142
141. A Merrill Lynch spokesperson stated that
"This is an innovative program to resolve all legal claims by employees registeted and non-
registered .... We believe the system will reduce the time and cost involved in resolving
claims. We believe that we will be a model, not just for the securities industry but for all
businesses developing fair workplaces for the 21st century."
Merrill Set to Move on New Dispute Resolution Program, SEC. WEEK, May 18, 1998, at 8 (quoting a
Merrill Lynch spokesperson). According to industry watchers,
the new program is another way to keep employees from going to court when they have a
dispute and maintaining arbitration on such issues in its present form as much as possible.
"[Merrill Lynch] is trying to keep from going to court as much as possible," one source
indicated. "It may cost more, but it could save money in the long-run. The goal is to
choose the new arbitration over court." The source also surmised that since Merrill Lynch
was paying for the outside arbitration, that was the path it wanted take instead of industry
arbitration. Jeffrey Liddle of Liddle & Robinson, called the new program a sham. "The
whole thing is just a far more coercive substitute for the current mandatory arbitration
system," said Liddle, a well known expert in the area. "It's not done with any good inten-
tions. The motivation behind this is not pure."
Id. Merrill Lynch's intentions are unimportant, however, so long as the market operates efficiently.
If employees believe that Merrill Lynch's product is a fair bargain for the waiver of certain rights,
who can stop them from contracting as they see fit?
142. See Darryl Van Duch, Merrill Deal Paves Way for New ADR, NAT'LL.J., MAY 18,1998, at B1.
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Merrill Lynch's dispute resolution process begins with a one-day media-
tion session, paid for by the firm. If the mediation session does not produce
a resolution to the conflict, the employee may file a claim in court, may go
to an Exchange arbitration system (NYSE or NASD), or may use an independ-
ent arbitrator such as the AAA or JAMS/Endispute. Merrill Lynch helps
persuade employees to use the AAA forum or JAMS/Endispute by offering
to pay all fees for the fora, excepting fees for the claimant's counsel.
Tellingly, PaineWebber followed Merrill Lynch's lead later in 1998."3
Under PaineWebber's revised dispute resolution program, employees may
attempt to settle claims through mediation (arranged and paid for by
PaineWebber), use arbitration, or take the claims to the courts.
Merrill Lynch and PaineWebber's actions indicate a pattern of forum
competition among firms. We also notice that their arbitration procedure
changes indicate a "race to the top" in terms of procedural protections for
industry employees. Still, we have not yet arrived at the end of the race.
V. REMAINING CONCERNS: MARKET FAILURES
AND MARKET PROTECTIONS
Unfortunately, Merrill Lynch and PaineWebber employees are the
only industry employees to date who enjoy an open market for employment
discrimination claims. However, the fact that at least two major employers
have already chosen to move away from mandatory arbitration may create
public pressure for other firms-the market for claims may correlate with
the market for employees, investors, and customers. Other firms might risk
losing some competitive advantage to Merrill Lynch or PaineWebber. On
the other hand, several market failures work against the development of the
claims market. These market failures must be overcome in order to bring
about a fair and open market across the entire securities industry. My con-
sideration of these market concerns moves from the fundamental question-
143. See PaineWebber Offers Workers Choices in Dispute Resolution, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
Dec. 7, 1998, at 4.
New York PaineWebber Group Inc. will offer employees a list of choices for resolving
discrimination and harassment disputes, another move toward dismantling U.S. securities
firms' industry-sponsored arbitration process.
... PaineWebber's plan, which begins Jan. 1, [1999,] lets employees attempt to settle
claims with local managers and human resources departments. Independent mediation,
arranged and paid for by the firm, and arbitration and the courts are now options at the
discretion of the employee. The program "will greatly benefit our employees by providing
easily accessible, flexible and constructive means for resolving disputes," said Gus Carlson, a
company spokesman.
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the appropriateness of a market response to discrimination-to the more
specific questions regarding potential market failures.
A. The Appropriateness of a Market Response
Is a market for claims an adequate and appropriate mechanism for resolv-
ing employment disputes and conquering the discrimination at the root of
the dispute? Presumably, an inability to provide an adequate product in the
claims market will adversely affect a company's ability to attract and retain
employees-thus, there is a correlation between the claims market and the labor
market. Ordinary market wisdom assumes that employers who discriminate
will suffer a competitive disadvantage because they must draw from a smaller
employee pool. However, several persuasive arguments and observations
suggest that market forces do not always stop discrimination, and in fact may
even perpetuate and contribute to discrimination.
First, third parties (clients, for example) might contribute to or indirectly
create discriminatory policies."' Suppose, for example, that the majority of
a company's customers discriminate, and do not like dealing with black
employees, women employees, or others. This company maintains a competi-
tive edge through discrimination, even if it does not recruit valuable minority
candidates.
Another type of discrimination occurs not because of irrational animus,
but because of statistical differences between groups."' For example, a com-
pany may avoid hiring women because it possesses persuasive data showing
that women are more likely, on average, to leave a high-pressure job than are
men. Alternatively, a company may surreptitiously avoid hiring a handi-
capped employee because it hopes to avoid capital expenditures required to
make business facilities accessible to the employee.
Finally, to the extent that discrimination already exists in an industry,
the market environment might already include discriminatory programs and
patterns. Thus, the cost in human capital required to enter and succeed in
the market may be too high for new market participants-those who have
historically suffered discrimination.'46 As efforts to enter a profession repeat-
edly fail, potential market players will shy away from the profession, resulting
in an ever-decreasing number of minority applicants.47
144. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 100, at 153.
145. See id. at 155.
146. See id. at 156-57.
147. Professor Cass Sunstein notes, however, that "this picture is too bleak in many settings."
Id. at 158. The "extraordinary persistence" of minority efforts to enter traditionally white, male
professions "is one of the most striking phenomena of the post-World War II period." Id. Indeed,
some people respond to discrimination by increasing their efforts to break into a profession. See id.
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These arguments underscore the primary reason to prefer a regulatory
co-opetition model over a regulatory competition model for the resolution
of employment discrimination claims: A market without vertical competi-
tion, which includes some regulatory pressure, probably could not supply
a fair discrimination claim dispute resolution. On the other hand, a regula-
tory, co-opetitive market will be able to respond to concerns that other
market paradigms cannot. Rather than relying on market forces to break up
market barriers, as does the regulatory competition model, the regulatory
co-opetition model depends on governmental agency supervision, primarily
through the efforts of the EEOC, and to a lesser extent, the SEC, who are in
turn empowered by appropriate legislative reform. The regulatory co-opetition
model also relies on vertical competitive pressures from the court systems. The
threat of litigation, with the possibility of large awards and negative public-
ity, can have a serious influence on the arbitration procedures of industry
firms.
148
Having considered the appropriateness of an employment discrimi-
nation claims market, we now shift our focus to the specific market failures
that impede the market's efficient operation.
B. The Problem of Imperfect Information
The first market failure to consider is the problem of imperfect infor-
mation. The problem of imperfect information actually concerns two separate
issues: the problem of imperfect predispute information, and the problem of
imperfect postdispute information, which I shall discuss in turn.
1. Predispute Information
The market delivers inefficient outcomes to the extent that the public
and potential employees are not aware of, or have no access to, information
about firm policies. Often, employees wooed by reputable firms will not
consider the potential for employment disputes, nor even consider the
content of the piles of forms their new employer asks them to sign."
148. As information technology shifts industry firms' focus from regional or national to global,
and allows customers and investors instant access to detailed corporate news and information, securities
firms will doubtlessly do all they can to preserve a good (or at least neutral) public image. How-
ever, as I discuss in the next part, we must be careful not to place too much faith on the effects of
publicity. See infra Part V.B.
149. According to Bales,
It is not difficult to imagine an employer giving a new employee a stack of ten or fifteen
employment documents to sign and only a few minutes to sign them. Nor is it reasonable
to assume that, even under the best of circumstances, more than a small percentage of
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Furthermore, one might argue that employees, investors, and customers
generally do not understand or care about a firm's arbitration policy,
especially when the effects of various policies are unclear.
In an unregulated, horizontal market for claims, the lack of information
and the lack of interest (until a claim arises) combine to produce an inefficient
market outcome. The first answer to the problem of imperfect information
is simply more information, or more accurate information. Thus, the general
and industry media, may alleviate the problem of imperfect information as
discrimination suits against large firms (especially class action suits) make
national news and receive in-depth treatment through industry reporters. Talk
of the firm's employment and dispute resolution practices occasionally accom-
panies reports of the cases, and the policy information may trickle down
to industry employees, prospective employees, clients, and investors.15° As
the public gains access to correct market information, more efficient (less
discriminatory) firms should enjoy some advantage over firms with discrimi-
natory policies and practices.
However, we must be careful not to exaggerate the effect of the aware-
ness of discriminatory policies on employee choice. Professor Sarah Rudolph
Cole argues that
the publicity surrounding employment disputes typically focuses on the
dispute and how it is resolved by judge and jury. Publicity about the
use of arbitration to resolve employment disputes and the consequent
effects arbitration has on the resolution of discrimination claims is quite
limited. Thus, the numerous newspaper articles about statutory discrimi-
nation claims are unlikely to have a perceptible effect on an employee's
risk assessment.
Even when employees have some basic policy information, they might
inaccurately perceive their risk of suffering from discriminatory behavior in the
employees will read and understand agreements they sign committing them to binding
arbitration. Instead, an employee usually signs the agreement with little or no thought of
future employment law violations or of what effect the agreement will have on obtaining
redress for such a violation.
BALES, supra note 21, at 163 (footnotes omitted). The memories of my own employment with a
securities firm do not include any recollection of signing a mandatory arbitration clause, although
I am sure that I signed one. As Jeffrey Stempel notes, "people want to eat first and consider legal and
philosophical implications later." Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L.
REV. 1377, 1387 (1991).
150. Obviously, the media may also contribute to the problem of imperfect information. To
the extent that they accurately publicize the policies of industry firms, and employees act on the
information, the media represent an important weapon to combat the problem.
151. Cole, supra note 4, at 481 (footnotes omitted).
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workplace.' Inaccurate risk assessment might bring employees to agree to ulti-
mately unsatisfactory contract terms (for example, mandatory arbitration).
The vertical competition dynamic is imperative to the creation and
maintenance of a fair claims market. As a market protection, federal regulators
(such as the EEOC and the SEC) and federal competitors (the courts) must
step in to ensure that adequate information is available to employees, that
employment contracts are fair, and that the lawyerspeak of employment con-
tracts is disclosed as intelligible information so that employees will clearly
understand their rights and responsibilities. Mandatory disclosure forms, such
as those distributed to NASD registrants, are thus an important part of the
solution to the problem of incomplete information. However, an employee's
first exposure to a firm's arbitration procedures may come after the end of
a grueling interview process, when an employee has already given notice
to a former employer, or when she has declined further interviews with
other firms. At this point, an anxious new employee may note the arbitra-
tion clause, pray that she never has to see it again, and sign the forms. The
EEOC or the SEC (and perhaps the SROs) might respond by pressing indus-
try employers to provide disclosure statements on dispute resolution policies
before the employer asks the employee to accept an offer. Regulators might
also require that, along with a written explanation of crucial employment and
dispute resolution policies, a human resources officer clearly explains the poli-
cies to the employee before the employee accepts the offer of employment.
Industry recruiters and school placement officers might also provide valu-
able protection. These professionals should take care to thoroughly under-
stand the various employment and dispute resolution policies of industry
firms. They should also take great care to avoid referring minority candidates
to discriminatory firms, and should make nonminority candidates aware of the
firm's practices. As Sunstein notes, some firms with third-party discriminatory
pressures may benefit by drawing from a nonminority pool. However, this
smaller pool may dry up as nonminority applicants, fully informed of the
firms' discriminatory practices, choose not to seek employment with those
firms.
Above all, recruiters and placement officers must understand a candidate's
risk perception. They must carefully manage candidate expectations through
the use of more accurate information sources, such as employment data and
statistics on arbitration decisions, in order to combat inaccurate risk
152. See Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 465 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds.,
1982); see also Cole, supra note 4, at 481.
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perceptions developed through false or incomplete information and limited
experiences.
2. Postdispute Information
After a dispute has arisen, employees must understand the differences
between arbitration and litigation in order to make an informed market
choice among dispute resolution options. Again, federal regulators and
SROs must play an important role in ensuring that product information
reaches claimants. First, the SROs should distribute accurate and complete
information on the procedural aspects of industry dispute resolution and
conventional litigation. The federal regulatory bodies, the SEC and the
EEOC, should ensure that the information provided by an SRO does not create
a bias toward arbitration-its slight, natural bias as an industry organization-
but should ensure that the benefits and burdens of each system are weighed
by the claimant according to her own needs and desires. The EEOC might
also continue to offer claimants direct counseling services. Ideally, the EEOC
would not promote federal dispute resolution services to the detriment of
arbitration-its slight, natural bias as an employee advocate-but would act
as a market facilitator.
C. Too Few Competitors in the Marketplace
Another problem that contributes to the inefficiency of the market is
that there are simply too few competitors in the marketplace. Industry
arbitration has been the only product available in the mandatory arbitra-
tion regime. Although there are many competitors in a general sense-that
is, many different firms trying to attract the same business and the best
people to run that business-the market competitors operated under a de
facto monopoly. Employees could bring claims before NASD or NYSE
panels, but they could not bring claims to court or to nonindustry arbitra-
tion. So, while there was a degree (perhaps an insignificant degree) of hori-
zontal competition among the industry arbitral fora, there was no vertical
competition-competition between the courts, industry arbitration, and the
nonindustry arbitration systems of the member firms. After the introduction
of vertical competition, market pressures should compel industry arbitration
providers to introduce viable alternative legal products to conventional liti-
gation through the courts.
The problem of too few competitors in the marketplace has been reme-
died voluntarily by some participants (Merrill Lynch and PaineWebber), but
the majority of firms have resisted changes to their arbitration procedures,
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except to the extent that these firms relied on industry arbitration provided
by the NASD or the NYSE. Because the NASD still hears arbitration claims
subject to a firm's mandatory predispute arbitration agreement, many firms
will not alter their policies unless forced by the market through the free flow
of information to client-claimants and others.
The lack of competitors presents the greatest challenge to the efficient
function of the claims market. Many industry employees might have only
two options-unattractive NYSE arbitration (which has not yet succumbed
to market pressures and may not ever, because, as with the courts, the
NYSE has little to gain by attracting claims) and conventional litigation.
This market barrier would easily be broken down by the Civil Rights Proce-
dures Protection Act, which would ensure vertical competition and encourage
the development of more horizontal competitors. The Civil Rights Procedures
Protection Act is a crucial aspect of claims market reform because the act
eliminates anticompetitive, inefficient, single-source claims markets.
Clearly, the market should be left to operate unfettered by excessive gov-
ernmental regulation. 5' Securities industry firms should be allowed to fashion
inventive solutions in an effort to preserve arbitration and make it more
attractive for claimants. However, government must ensure the competitive-
ness of the market by expanding the market to all industry firms (ensuring
adequate horizontal competition), by entering into the market itself (ensuring
vertical competition), and by policing fair employment practices and dispute
resolution standards as a regulator.'54
D. Lack of Mobility
Congressional action on the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act
could also resolve the third, and perhaps most obvious, problem with
mandatory arbitration of employment disputes: lack of employee mobility.
The lack of employee mobility relates closely to the problem of too few
competitors. The NASD rule change does not force its members to abandon
mandatory arbitration agreements with their own employees. For industry
employees whose firms mandate arbitration, there is no possibility of par-
ticipating in the employment discrimination claims market. For example,
153. See infra Part V.D.
154. By establishing minimal standards, such as appealability of egregious decisions, for example,
the government can ensure that employees are not selling their rights, or at least not selling them
too cheaply. Gilmer may support the sale of certain statutory rights in return for employment,
even when the employees do not understand that they are selling those rights. However, by removing
mandatory arbitration agreements from the employment discrimination context, employers cannot
force employees to sell their rights as a condition of employment, and thus employees may par-
ticipate as more knowledgeable consumers in the marketplace.
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Salomon Smith Barney employees recently issued a new employee handbook
stating that employees must arbitrate all employment-related claims through
industry arbitration. Salomon Smith Barney also stipulates in the agreement
that employees must use NASD arbitration because the NASD will still hear
employment discrimination claims under predispute arbitration agreements,
whereas under NYSE rules, statutory discrimination claims are not eligible
for arbitration pursuant to predispute agreements to arbitrate.
Salomon Smith Barney has also sought to maintain an advantage by
creating a rule limiting damage awards. According to employment attorney
Cliff Palefsky, who chairs the National Employment Lawyers Association's
securities arbitration committee, the firm ran an "end around the NASD's rule-
making process"'5 by stipulating in the handbook that 'arbitrator(s) shall
not have the authority to award punitive or exemplary damages except
where provided for by applicable statute' and that 'arbitrators can't make
arbitrary or capricious' awards."'56 Palefsky has urged the NASD to refuse to
accept arbitration cases brought under the new handbook rules.'57
Although Salomon Smith Barney employees may be dissatisfied with
the firm's new policies, many of these employees do not have the realistic
option of leaving the firm. Often, employees in lower-paying jobs feel that
they are expendable and, therefore, would not risk disclosing their displeasure
with the policies. Even some highly skilled employees may not be able to
transfer to a firm with more employee-friendly policies because of market
changes or mergers that make their services less valuable in the market for
employees.
The lack of mobility for Salomon Smith Barney employees arises because
the firm has limited the options for its employees in the market for dis-
crimination claims. As a general market principle, the lack of an adequate
number of competitors and the lack of mobility of industry employees create
a drag on the overall efficiency of the market. The actions by a large firm
such as Salomon Smith Barney thus impose inefficient, or less efficient, out-
comes on employees of other industry firms, as Salomon employees will be
less able to exercise market choice by moving to another company. Salomon
Smith Barney's actions are essentially anticompetitive, and market regulators
155. SSB Keeps Arbitration Mandatory, REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVE, July 30, 1999, at 24.
'I dare say that the arbitrators, when faced with that [prohibition on punitive and exemplary dam-
ages], would totally disregard it, as they should."' Id. (quoting David Robbins, a New York securities
attorney).
156. Id. (quoting the handbook). Salomon Smith Barney has not clarified what would constitute
an "arbitrary or capricious" award, stating only that "'[w]e have worked diligently to develop a fair
and lawful arbitration policy for our employees. It is our intent to comply with the rules and regulations
of any forums."' Id. (quoting Salomon Smith Barney's press office).
157. See id.
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must step in to ensure that the firm's employees have real options in a
competitive marketplace. By completely eliminating mandatory arbitration
of employment discrimination claims through passage of the Civil Rights
Procedures Protection Act, the federal government will provide a competitive
market, and industry arbitration will make greater efficiency gains to the bene-
fit of market participants.
E. Excessive Regulation
Finally, although I have stressed the importance of vertical competition
and governmental regulation in the marketplace for claims, excessive regula-
tion may also create a drag on market efficiency. Regulators should monitor
the extent to which the imposition of regulations on industry employers
increases administrative burdens. An increase in the administrative burden
may not only increase the costs for arbitration, but may also slow the arbi-
tration process, thus eroding key competitive advantages.
Consider the disclosure requirement I discuss above. Undoubtedly,
enhanced disclosure requirements will increase administrative costs. However,
informational benefits should offset these costs, resulting in overall efficiency
gains. Nevertheless, if the disclosure requirement compels employers to furnish
excessive amounts of information, employees could suffer information
overload, causing them to treat the vast amount of information as equivalent
to no information at all.158 With this possibility in mind, regulators must pare
down the disclosure requirements to include only the most essential infor-
mation in the most intelligible format possible.
Another regulatory danger is that claims market regulation may become
so excessive as to collapse under its own weight.159 This might occur when
the regulations become too numerous to enforce, require too much time and
expense from regulators operating in a limited administrative capacity, or
are not enforced because regulators simply view the regulations as overly
burdensome or unfair. Regulators can avoid detrimental overregulation by
working closely with the industry on the development of new regulations,
and by allowing the industry to develop useful and creative solutions through
self-regulation. 6 '
158. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 100, at 284-85; see also Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive
Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 690-91 (1985).
159. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 100, at 277.
160. See Esty & Geradin, supra note 2, at 249-50.
CONCLUSION
In this Comment, I introduce the developing market for employment
discrimination claims, noting some of the market barriers impeding the prog-
ress of the market, as well as some market protections that will promote the
development of the market. The regulatory co-opetition model that I have
introduced relies on the federal government to play an active role in ensuring
that the market remains competitive and that employees are able to choose
among fairly priced legal products. Since the general acceptance and inclusion
of the mandatory arbitration clause, securities industry arbitration has been
largely unresponsive to employee needs. Consequently, practically no employee
with the possibility of pursuing litigation would choose arbitration. Rather
than abandon arbitration, which still enjoys many natural advantages over
litigation, the government and the securities industry must work together to
develop a competitive discrimination claims market to produce more effi-
cient arbitration systems. Employers and employees will both benefit from
these efficiency gains (although, in the near term, employers might have
to give up some advantages they enjoyed under the mandatory arbitration
regime).
The market is not yet fully functioning. Many industry firms still require
employees to arbitrate discrimination claims pursuant to mandatory arbitration
clauses. Because horizontal market pressures on these companies are weak,
governmental intervention is required to develop a truly competitive claims
market. If the federal government steps in as a vertical competitor and regula-
tor through the elimination of mandatory arbitration clauses, the resulting
open, competitive, and regulated claims market will ensure that the benefits
of arbitration are available to all securities industry employment discrimination
claimants.
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